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STEPHEN R. BOWERS 
CONTRAST AND CONTINUITY: 
HONECKER'S POLICY 
TOWARD THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC AND WEST BERLIN 
In May 1971, on the eve of the conference of the East German Socialist Unity 
Party (SED), Walter Ulbricht was replaced as First Secretary of the SED, a post 
which he had held for almost two decades. His replacement was a fifty-nine-year-
old party functionary, Erich Honecker. In the period prior to his retirement, 
Ulbricht had apparently become increasingly reluctant to support Soviet efforts 
to achieve detente in Germany. Consequently, according to many observers, the 
USSR decided to replace him with Politburo member Erich Honecker, a man 
regarded as much more pliant and flexible than the aging Ulbricht. 
In order to understand the necessity for Ulbricht's removal, one must consider 
the role that the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had begun to play in 
Eastern Europe during the last years of his rule. Ulbricht's remarks at the cere-
mony for the 19th anniversary of the founding of the GDR reflected the tone of 
his general orientation toward the West. In his toast Ulbricht declared that it was 
"necessary to be vigilant, to effectively counter and oppose the methods of psy-
chological warfare, of economic warfare, and of anti-social activity" that charac-
terized Western policy.! During these years, the GDR was portrayed in official 
literature as an embattled garrison reinforcing its.defenses against a hostile and 
aggressive West. The prime exemplar of this assault on the GDR was said to be the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) which was condemned with increased fury 
and frequency after the introduction of Brandt's conciliatory Ostpolitik. Neues 
Deutschland editorialized that the "much vaunted 'accommodation' shown by the 
Federal Republic these days consists of a flood of more or less beautiful words 
and nothing else."2 
While such an outlook was not inconsistent with East German policy of the 
previous two decades, it was becoming increasingly discordant in the atmosphere 
of new Soviet policy formulations. By 1970 Soviet-West German relations had 
advanced to a stage clearly unacceptable from Ulbricht's point of view. Not only 
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the Soviet Union but Poland and Rumania as well were pressuring the East Ger-
mans into bilateral talks with the Brandt government. The continuing East Ger-
man hostility toward the FRG squarely contradicted the basic views expressed by 
the USSR in its negotiations on a renunciation of force agreement with Bonn. 
While the Soviet Union and Poland were making considerable progress in talks 
with West Germany, Ulbricht's SED was issuing a series of shrill denunciations 
of the West German policy which made such progress possible. As it became 
obvious that most of East Europe was following Moscow's lead in improving 
relations with the FRG, East German demands for recognition of the GDR as 
the price for normalization of relations with Bonn were seriously undermined. As 
Robin Alison Remington observed, "The long-standing East German nightmare of 
being isolated in the heart of Europe was, from Pankow's point of view, taking on 
an ugly daytime reality.,,3 As the SED's foreign policy had become more active, 
it had assumed an increasingly negative quality in relation to the policies pursued 
by the USSR and the other members of the Warsaw Pact. Consequently, the GDR 
was being alienated from its allies and the intransigent Ulbricht was becoming 
a liability. Honecker, with his safe conservative background and long record of 
service in the Party apparatus, provided a suitable and stable alternative to the 
aging Ulbricht. 
Honecker's background does much to explain why his reaction to the develop-
ment of detente differed from that of his predecessor. In analyzing the factions 
in the SED Politburo prior to Ulbricht's removal, Peter C. Ludz placed Honecker 
within the group he described as "perhaps the most important in the Politburo." 
Individuals in this faction are "flexible and diversified functionaries [who] range 
from conservative to dogmatic, without, however, being inflexible.,,4 Honecker's 
former associate, Heinz Lippmann, has provided additional insight into those 
elements of Honecker's outlook that make him inclined to accept Soviet policy 
shifts. Lippmann writes that Honecker is unconditionally loyal to the USSR and 
has demonstrated his loyalty countless times. Furthermore, Honecker has never 
maintained that the GDR occupies any special position and has urged his country 
to exhibit modesty in its relations with the USSR. 5 Finally, the fact that 
Honecker was not too strong within the SED must have enhanced his attractive-
ness to the Soviet leadership as well as his dependence upon the Kremlin. An indi-
vidual who was very weak within the party would have been a willing Soviet vas-
sal, but might have lacked the capability to command his own organization. One 
who was too strong might have become independent from the USSR. Honecker, 
strong but not too strong, must have appeared to strike a favorable balance, 
exhibiting the strength to command the SED but not to shed his dependency on 
the Kremlin. 
One need only contrast Honecker's qualities with Ulbricht's obvious arrogance 
in order to see the difference between the two men. Ulbricht's pretensions to 
omniscience and his compulsion to make pronouncements on everything from 
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architecture to athletics were reminiscent of Stalin and undoubtedly irksome to 
the Kremlin. Ulbricht never tired of reminding listeners that he had been a contem-
porary of Lenin and encouraged a cult of personality about himself unparalleled in 
Eastern Europe. It is hardly surprising that the didactic Ulbricht, many years senior 
to the Soviet leadership, was reluctant to accept shifts in policy which he person-
ally saw as damaging to East German interests. 
The Honecker policy toward West Germany has differed markedly from the 
Ulbricht policy in terms of actual progress on important issues such as West Berlin. 
One of the most notable examples, the Four Power Agreement on Berlin, came 
within a few months of Ulbricht's replacement. However, the rhetoric of the 
Honecker years has retained many characteristics of the Ulbricht era, suggesting 
elements of continuity in GDR foreign policy along with elements of change. The 
tone of the East German rhetoric toward the West in general and the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and West Berlin in particular has been characterized by a concern 
over the alledgedly negative qualities of the FRG, attacks on West German and 
West Berlin policies and personalities, continued emphasis on the Western military 
threat, and charges that West Berlin has permitted itself to be misused by the West. 
The Negative Image of the West Modified 
Shortly after the announcement of Ulbricht's resignation, Honecker himself, in 
his report on the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, made explicit the East German view that West Germany had not changed. 
According to the new First Secretary, the CPSU and the SED were "agreed that 
nothing had changed as regards the reactionary and aggressive character of imperial-
ism and the Federal Republic of Germany.,,6 An editorial in Neues Deutschland a 
few days later was consistent with Honecker's harsh theme in its condemnation of 
the current role of the FRG. According to the editorial, the FRG was to "assume 
the old function of the German Reich since the end of World War Two-that is to 
say, form the spearhead of the imperialist world system against socialism."7 While 
such statements must be balanced with subsequent positive developments, they do 
serve to establish a pattern of continuity between the Ulbricht and Honecker 
regimes in terms of the East German conception of what the FRG is supposed to 
represent. In this regard, the similarities outnumber the differences. 
In evaluating West German policy iniatives toward the GDR, Honecker's regime 
continued a critical attitude. Many West German offers were simply dismissed as 
"verbal compromises" lacking in any real substance. In the summer of 1971 when 
the Bonn government rescinded official directives on avoiding the use of the term 
"GDR," the East Germans responded by declaring that this was no more than a 
"feeble and illogical adjustment to the force of reality and a way of yielding to the 
pressure of public opinion. It does not indicate a change of policy ."8 Just as the 
East Germans frequently charged that the FRG wanted to believe the worst about 
the GDR, the GDR press seemed to insist on believing only the worst about West 
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German intentions. According to East German sources, the FRG had done nothing 
to improve relations with East Germany. In fact, Bonn was said to be engaging in 
an international diplomatic offensive against East Germany in order to block its 
membership in the United Nations and prevent other states from extending diplo-
matic recognition to the GDR.9 The official East German opinion was that the FRG 
was continuing to adhere to the sole representation doctrine and engaging in an 
ideological crusade against East Berlin. 1 0 
Individuals who were associated with such policies were frequently singled out 
for personal attacks by the East German news media. As FRG Minister of Interior, 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher was accused oflacking respect for Bonn's treaties with the 
USSR and Poland when he questioned East German frontier measures. Genscher, 
according to the GDR press, failed to recognize the existing frontiers of Europe, 
including those of East Germany.II In a similar fashion, FRG Minister Egon Bahr 
has been attacked for his alleged wish to cause the GDR "to disappear." In com-
menting on this, the East German radio program, "Voice of the GDR," charged 
that the Bahr statement was proof that the West German government had no real 
intention of renouncing its "revanchist" policies. 1 2 West Berlin's mayor Klaus 
Scheutz was branded as one of "those people who maintain that West Berlin was 
best governed during the days of the cold war." A Neues Deutschland editorial 
charged that Scheutz had no interest in normalization of relations with the GDR 
and was acting against the best interests of the West Berlin population. 1 3 While 
Brandt himself was generally accorded reasonably restrained treatment by the GDR 
press during this time, he has also been subjected to occasional severe criticism. 
When Brandt made what the GDR authorities viewed as disparaging remarks about 
the attitude of East German officials in April 1973, the response was an East 
German attack in which the Chancellor was charged with hostility to the GDR and 
being blinded by Social Democratic anticommunism. 1 4 The new West German 
chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, has been the subject of numerous attacks over the 
years. His work as Defense Minister attracted most of the criticism he received. In 
that capacity, according to Honecker, Schmidt carried on the "infamous work 
begun by Strauss" and won the praise of Nazi elements in West Germany.I 5 
Since Honecker's assumption of power in May 1971 the GDR has continued to 
stress the military threat posed by West Germany and NATO. This theme is essen-
tially a continuation of one started in the first years after the partition of Germany 
and was played upon in varying degrees during the 1950s and 1960s. The basic idea 
is that the military power of the West is directed against the East European states. 
The specter of a nuclear military force under the control of the Bonn government 
has been an element of this theme. Neues Deutschland editorialized in 1973: 
In its military policy the FRG is at present in theory and practice pursuing the 
twofold aim of increasing the conventional strength of the Bundeswehr by arming 
itself and getting a hold on nuclear weapons by the presence of American forces in 
the FRG. I6 
~ 
')i " il 
1 
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Any efforts at upgrading the technical quality of the West German military have 
been portrayed as a violation of the spirit of detente. In commenting on West 
German military modernization plans in 1972, "Voice of the GDR" asked rhetori-
cally how such plans could be compatible with the West German treaties with the 
USSR and Poland. 1 7 Speaking on the same program in 1975, GDR commentator 
Guenter Engmann warned of the "intensified rearmament" taking place in the FRG. 
Not only was a new weapons system planned, but, Engmann charged, "atomic 
mines" were to be placed on the West German frontiers with the GDR and Czecho-
slovakia.1s This image of the "Western threat" is used as jUstification for East 
German military preparedness. In 1971 Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann declared 
that peace in Europe had been preserved, not by a balance of power, but only by a 
clear and growing military superiority of the East. Hoffmann cited the alliance of 
the United States and the FRG as proof that continued efforts to guarantee military 
superiority of the WTO forces, including those of the GDR, were a necessity.I 9 
The Honecker regime has continued to stress that West Berlin threatens the GDR. 
However, since early 1971, the rhetoric about the West Berlin threat has been con-
siderably reduced from its previous level in terms of the intensity of the attacks and 
charges. The basic complaint has been that West Germany is attempting to extend 
its jurisdiction to West Berlin and govern it as though it were another Land of the 
FRG. The GDR has repeatedly charged that West Germany is attempting to govern 
the city through extensions of certain types of legislation, by drafting residents into 
the Bundeswehr, and by establishing offices of the government of the FRG in West 
Berlin. The West German plan put forward by Genscher as Minister of Interior in 
1973 to establish a branch of the Federal Environmental Protection Office in West 
Berlin aroused considerable displeasure in SED circles. Neues Deutschland described 
this plan as "political environmental pollution" and a violation of the Four Power 
Agreement on Berlin? 0 This reaction was typical of the response to West German 
efforts to perpetuate a political presence in West Berlin. The same reaction has been 
accorded visits by West German officials to the city for performance of official 
duties during the Honecker years. 
However, these years have also brought improvements in the political atmos-
phere surrounding the West Berlin issue. These developments clearly surpassed those 
of the Ulbricht regime. An indication of such improvements appeared in a speech 
by Honecker in 1972 in which he said that, while he was aware of the aggressive 
character of the FRG, he was also taking account, "especially from the point of 
view of foreign policy, of the positive aspect of the Brandt government. ,,2 1 Ulbricht 
had been unwilling to make such concessions to the West German Social Demo-
cratic Party (SPD); Honecker emphasized the changes in 1973 when he announced 
that he could see a transition from the cold war in the direction of detente.22 The 
GDR contributed to this situation in a radio program in March 1975 when commen-
tator Guenter Leuschner responded to the question of a listener who suggested that 
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the GDR had "put up with too much" by allowing Western violations of the Quadri-
partite Agreement on Berlin. In his restrained response to the obviously staged ques-
tion, Leuschner insisted that, while "we could not expect the Agreement to solve 
all the problems," the GDR had no choice but "to use every opportunity for con-
tractual settlements in the interest of peace." There would be, he acknowledged, 
"occasional attempts by the imperialist side" to violate treaties but "we do not put 
up with too much.,,23 
Negotiations since 1971 
The most important evidence, however, of this change in the political climate 
can be seen in the record of proposals and negotiations during the first years of the 
Honecker era. The most conspicuous of the agreements during these years was the 
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin in 1971. The East German Socialist Party (SED) 
press was effusive in its praise of the agreement, hailing is as "an important step 
towards detente in the heart of Europe." The party asserted that its leadership had 
been "fully informed" at all times by the Soviet Union regarding progress on the 
agreement and had made a "constructive contribution" itself to the successful con-
clusion of the agreement. 24 Expressing the USSR's appreciation of the GDR's role, 
CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) Politburo member Piotr Shelest 
agreed that the East German leadership did in fact playa "great constructive role.,,2 5 
The willingness of the SED to support the Soviet efforts to achieve detente was 
demonstrated by the prompt conclusion of the two agreements by East Germany 
with the Federal Republic and West Berlin on transit traffic to West Berlin.2 6 It is 
significant that these agreements were concluded without official diplomatic recog-
nition of the GDR by West Germany, a demand voiced by Ulbricht which pre-
viously barred such progress. Honecker seemed content in discussing the agreement 
with the Federal Republic of Germany to remark that by signing an agreement with 
the German Democratic Republic, West Germany had acknowledged East Germany 
as a "sovereign state." Honecker also commented that the documents represented 
an acceptance of the principal East German argument on West Berlin to the effect 
that the city is an independent political entity. The fact that Western demands for 
a Western-controlled corridor through the GDR's territory had been dropped was 
cited by Honecker as a major victory for East Germany. This, he argued, was a 
further "de facto" recognition of the GDR.2 7 
The desire for a further normalization of East Germany's relations with the FRG 
was satisfied by the successful conclusion of the Treaty on the Bases of Relations 
between the GDR and the FRG. While the treaty was initialed on November 8, 
1972, after a long political wrangle in West Germany, it did not come into force 
until June 21, 1973. On the occasion of the signing of the treaty, Dr. Michael Kohl 
declared that the GDR viewed the treaty as a vchicle for "bringing about the 
replacement of the cold war by detente and co-operation."2 8 As a logical continua-
tion of this process, negotiations began on the establishment of permanent missions 
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for the two Germanies in their respective capitals. These negotiations bore fruit in 
May 1974 when permanent missions were established in Bonn and East Berlin? 9 
The actual opening of the missions had been delayed for a short time as a result of 
the Guillaume spy case in West Germany. That the delay was no more than a few 
days is in itself remarkable. In an earlier time such an incident would have disrupted 
the entire process of normalization. 
The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin contained a reference to the possible 
exchange of territory in the case of enclaves such as Steinstucken and other small 
areas. The first exchange came as a result of an agreement in July 1972 between the 
GDR government and the West Berlin Senate. Under the agreement, a small piece 
of land near Potsdamer Platz was transferred to West Berlin for the price of thirty-
one million Deutsche Marks.30 A much more extensive territorial exchange was 
agreed to in 1974 involving land formerly under the control of the GDR Reichs-
bal1l1 in the Anhalter section of West Berlin? 1 
Another important step in the process of normalization occurred with the estab-
lishment of the Boundary Commission in 1973. The purpose of the commission 
was to review and supplement the demarcation of the East-West German border, to 
prepare the necessary documents on the actual course of the boundary, and to regu-
late other problems connected with the border. 32 Shortly after the establishment 
of the Boundary Commission, Bonn and East Berlin began talks on a public health 
agreement.33 The result of this series of talks was a Health Services Agreement 
which was signed in East Berlin on April 25, 1974. The need for such an agreement 
had been mentioned in the Treaty on the Bases of Relations between the GDR and 
the FRG.34 In September 1973 the GDR-FRG Frontier Agreements were signed. 
One dealt with caring for damage at the frontier and the other with the maintenance 
and development of the frontier waterways and the water engineering installations 
along the frontier. As a result of these agreements, provisions were implemented 
for reciprocal information at short notice regarding events such as fires, gale damage, 
landslides, and epidemics.3 5 Meanwhile, work continued on a possible post and tele-
communications agreement, a cultural agreement, and a judicial assistance agree-
ment between the GDR and the FRG and a variety of agreements between the GDR 
and West Berlin. One of the most important of the latter is an accident assistance 
agreement on which talks began in 1973. This agreement would cover the rendering 
of prompt aid after an accident on the sector boundary in Berlin. 
As a means of improving contacts among the GDR, the FRG, and West Berlin, 
negotiations continued in the area of telephone facilities, television programs, and 
press agreements. In July 1972 arrangements were made for increasing and improv-
ing telephone connections. As a result, thirty-two local exchanges in the Potsdam 
area could be reached from West Berlin by direct dialing. This measure was made 
possible by an agreement between the FRG Post Office and the GDR Postal 
Administration in 1971. Before that time no call could be placed from West Berlin 
to the GDR without going through an operator. 36 In 1975 provisions were made 
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for the opening of 240 self-dialing lines from West to East Berlin.3 7 In 1973 the 
prospect of an exchange of television programs between the FRG and the GDR was 
raised by Max Walter Schultz, the vice president of the GDR Authors' Union. 
Schultz expressed his desire to show "as much as possible ... a truly realistic pic-
ture of West German conditions-on the principle of reciprocity." 3 8 So far, how-
ever, there has been an absence of any higher official support for an exchange of 
television programs. The exchange of journalists between the GDR and the FRG 
and West Berlin, in contrast, did develop. By 1973 provisions were made for news 
coverage by GDRjournalists in Bonn and FRG journalists in East Berlin. The Ger .. 
man Press Agency (DPA) office in East Berlin, which opened in September 1973, 
was even equipped with a permanent teleplinter line connecting it with the DPA 
office in West Berlin.39 
The extent to which human contacts between East and West had improved in 
Germany could be seen by the statistics on travel to the GDR in 1973. During the 
year over 3,650,000 came from the Federal Republic and more than 3,461,000 
from West Berlin.4 0 The figures for 1972 are only slightly lower than these but in 
1971, before the implementation of the transit agreement, only 3,000,000 residents 
of West Berlin and the Federal Republic entered the GDR.41 This increase con-
tinued into the first quarter of 1975 when inter-German travel rose considerably. 
During the first three months of the year 700,000 West Germans visited the GDR, 
compared with 220,000 during the same period in 1974.42 Telephone contacts also 
increased during this period. While in 1970 there were only 700,000 calls from the 
FRG and West Berlin to the GDR, in 1973 the number reached 5.8 million.43 
The prospect for better economic relations has also improved during Honecker's 
tenure as First Secretary. By May 1975 East German authorities were speaking of 
a "good objective basis for international division of labor within the framework of 
peaceful coexistence." Such statements, however, have been tempered with warnings 
against the "long-term ideological softening up of socialism" and the creation of a 
"web of interdependence that would land the Soviet Union and the other socialist 
states in a dependency on imperialism." Nor, we are assured, will economic coopera-
tion "help stabilize imperialism.,,4 4 The most significant features of East Germany's 
economic relations with the FRG and West Berlin after 1971 were the sharp 
increase in West German imports into the GDR and the decline in imports from 
West Berlin. (See Table I.) The decline irt imports from West Berlin was coupled 
with a dramatic increase in exports to the city. When the overall, long-term trade 
picture is considered, the immediate results of the first full year of Honecker's 
admirtistration are less decisive irt appearance. (See Table n.) In 1973, talks 
between West Berlin and East Germany regarding the possible construction of an 
oil pipeline from the GDR to West Berlin were begun.4 5 It is possible that the SED 
leadership may envision a situation in which West Berlin might become oriented 
economically toward the GDR, thus increasing East Germany's ability to control 
the city. However, no extensive results have yet come from the talks and East 
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Germany's full intentions regarding trade with West Germany and West Berlin 
remain unclear. An example of the sort of development most desirable from the 
East German point of view was the decision in May 1975 by the West German firm 
Hoechst to construct a 600 million mark chemical plant in East Germany.4 6 The 
mere fact that economic talks have been in progress for some time does by itself 
signify a political change in East Germany, a change in the direction of increasing 
contacts with the FRG and West Berlin. 
Table I 
Imports and Exports with West Germany and 
West Berlin, 1970-1972 (absolute amounts in millions of settlement marks) 
export 1970 1971 1972 
West Germany 1,514.9 1,794.6 1,708.2 
West Berlin 373.5 347.1 495.7 
import 1970 1971 1972 
West Germany 1,913. 7 1,913.1 2,434.3 
West Berlin 247.9 239.8 189.5 
Source: Statistical Pocket Book oJ tlz e CDR, (Berlin, GDR: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1973) 
The extent of the change in policy was revealed in 1973 by a meeting which 
Honecker held with the chairman of the FRG Social Democratic Party, Herbert 
Werhner, and the chairman of the SPD's coalition partner, the FDP.47 Given the 
traditionally hostile East German view of the Social Democrats, such a meeting, 
simply for an "exchange of views" rather than to face a crisis, must be viewed 
as significant. The fact that Honecker himself, rather than some lower-ranking SED 
official, participated in the meeting further increases its meaning. Later, official 
East German hospitality was extended to the Social Democratic Premier of Hesse 
who visited Erfurt to discuss matters that might arise due to the proximity of Hesse 
to Erfurt.48 Even more interesting, however, was the decision in 1974 to allow 
West Germany to help restore churches in the GDR. In November 1974 it was 
announced that the churches of West Germany would aid in the restoration of 
forty-four churches in thirty-five East German towns.49 
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Table II 
GDR Imports and Exports with West Germany 
and West Berlin, 1957-1972 (as a percentage of total GDR trade) 
import export 
1957 11.38% 11.30% 
1958 11.30 11.18 
1959 11.40 10.83 
1960 9.51 10.98 
1961 8.86 9.67 
1962 8.14 8.86 
1963 8.46 8.95 
1964 9.74 9.04 
1965 9.38 9.58 
1966 10.87 9.57 
1967 9.35 8.60 
1968 8.51 8.74 
1969 11.28 8.80 
1970 10.61 9.81 
1971 10.33 10.05 
1972 11.48 9.20 
Source: United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, various years 
Confrontations since 1971 
Even though the overall record is one of positive achievement, the Honecker 
period has not been without negative developments. The most prominent dispute 
of the Honecker regime with West Berlin and the Federal Republic has centered 
around the alleged abuse of the transit routes to West Berlin. The first indication 
of this issue came i!1 April 1972 following the temporary implementation of the 
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transit agreement by the GDR. After an estimated 300,000 West Berliners made 
use of the temporary facilities for visits to the East, GDR Foreign Minister Otto 
Winzer charged that "rightist extremist and revanchist forces" had attempted to 
misuse the GDR's "generous gesture of good will for evil purposes.,,50 An editorial 
in Neues Deutschland in August 1973 signalled the beginning of an East German 
campaign against the "abuse" of the transit routes, with the primary concern being 
the activities of commercial escape assistance organizations operating from West 
Berlin and the FRG. According to the editorial, 
There are forces at work to undermine the Transit Agreement and this is being 
done from the territory of the FRG and West Berlin, whose citizens derive direct 
advantage from the Agreement. The Transit Agreement, which is being implemented 
by the GDR authorities in spirit and in letter, has recently been increasingly mis-
used by profiteers. From the FRG and West Berlin bands of criminals are at work 
who, for fees of DM 40,000 to DM 80,000, smuggle people across the border-
people who hope for a life of luxury in the FRG or West Berlin; for instance, scien-
tists, doctors, and other specialists are being promised such a life by official 
quarters. 51 
The editorial continued by denouncing the freedom of the commerical establish-
ments to advertise their services in newspapers in West Berlin and the 'FRG and the 
apparent indifference, if not assistance, of the Western officials. It concluded with 
a demand that Lhe authorities in West Berlin and West Germany do their part to 
aid implementation of the Transit Agreement by taking actions against those 
responsible for the escape activities. 
The Neues Deutschland warning was followed by the implementation of much 
more rigid East German checks on traffic to and from West Berlin. The next month 
the SED repeated its demand for stricter controls to stop illegal crossings to the 
Federal Republic and West Berlin and attacked the idea of "freedom of movement" 
as a cover for those who simply want to escape prosecution for crimes against the 
GDR.52 Within a week, the East German news agency ADN reported that a num-
ber of citizens of West Berlin and West Germany had been taken into custody for 
violation of the Transit Agreement. 5 3 More arrests followed on a regular basis and, 
on October 30, the GDR government began a much publicized tJial of several 
"traders in human lives" in East Berlin.54 By February 1974 a total of 150 West 
Berliners and West Germans had been arrested by GDR authorities and charged as 
escape helpers. Forty of this number had been sentenced, many of them for up to 
ten years imprisonment. 55 While the arrests of Western escape helpers are used for 
maximum propaganda benefit, the trials of GDR citizens who have attempted to 
escape are kept secret. Every effort is made to avoid any publication of details of 
the efforts since this information might aid others desiring to escape later. 56 It is 
also desirable that the organizations assisting in escapes not be permitted to learn 
from their mistakes. 
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Meanwhile, the number of escapes from the GDR for 1973 rose by 16 percent 
over the previous year, according to figures released by the West Berlin-based 13th 
August Working Group. The total number of escapes in 1973 was 6,450. The 
increase was considered a result of escapes via the transit routes during the first 
half of the year, prior to the initiation of more stringent checks. However, the num-
ber of "barrier-breakers" was also up considerably, 49 percent over 1972, and that 
also contributed to the overall increase. Almost 1,600 of the escapees were "barrier-
breakers" who required no assistance from outside individuals. 5 7 The next year, 
however, was less embarrassing to the GDR. In 1974 the number of escapes had 
dropped to 5,324, with only 969 of that number being "barrier-breakers." The 
number of frontier guards fleeing East Germany also dropped from 28 in 1973 to 
22 in 1974.58 
A related controversy during this time centered around the matter of currency 
violations by Western visitors. Since 1964 visitors had been required to exchange 
a minimum of ten marks a day for overnight stays in the GDR and five marks a day 
for one-day visits to East Berlin. In November 1973 the GDR authorities doubled 
these amounts and applied the new regulations to previously exempt old-age pen-
sioners. The official argument was that this action was necessary in order to dis-
courage the illegal exchange of GDR currency in West Berlin or the FRG at approxi-
mately one-third of its face value. These exchanges, considered illegal by the GDR, 
were conducted openly at many Western banks and the rates were advertised in the 
Western press and in the windows of banks. The East German leadership viewed 
such exchanges and the illegal importation of the currency as an effort to return to 
the pre-Wall situation with its disruption of the GDR economy. These activities 
were seen as "deliberate damage" to the GDR and a "violation of its sovereign 
rights as well as interference in its domestic affairs."5 9 
While the East Germans objected to the sale of their currency in the West as well 
as its importation into the GDR, they were in no position to enforce prohibitions 
against the former, so they concentrated on attempting to prevent travelers from 
bringing Western-purchased GDR marks into East Germany. Over a period of about 
one year, more than 500,000 GDR marks were confiscated at border crossing 
points.6o The doubling of the mandatory minimum exchange for tourists was 
intended to remove much of the incentive for bringing in such marks. Confiscation 
of more than a fraction of the illegal marks was obviously impossible. The introduc-
tion of the new regulations without warning and their application to old-age pen-
sioners visiting relatives and friends in the GDR raised Western suspicions that the 
real intention of this action was to reduce the number of Western visitors coming 
to the GDR. Whether this intention motivated the action or not, it certainly did 
have that effect. 
A survey of three checkpoints into the GDR in Lower Saxony over the weekend 
of November 30 to December 2 demonstrated the effect of the regulations. While 
on the previous weekend over 6,800 travelers had crossed into the East, only 1,300 
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made the journey that weekend. 61 A count of the number of automobiles using 
all crossings into East Germany for the three days of the Christmas holiday demon-
strated a similar result. At Christmastime, 1972, over 23,000 cars from W~st Ger-
many and West Berlin crossed, but only 12,600 automobiles crossed during the 
1973 holiday.6 2 Numerous protests from the West and several meetings of repre-
sentatives from the West Berlin Senate with East German authorities failed to bring 
a return to the old regulations. However, by October 1974, a compromise was 
reached in which the GDR agreed to require the exchange of only 6.5 DM for one-
day visits to East Berlin and 13 DM for longer stays in the GDR.63 The absence of 
any public Soviet support for the SED's position may have been a decisive factor 
in the decision. 
In early 1975 there was a serious dispute over the question of consular represen-
tation for Germans abroad when the GDR and Austria signed a consular agreement. 
The FRG Foreign Ministry insisted that the Austrian recognition of GDR citizen-
ship would not affect the right of the West German consulate to look after East 
Germans fleeing into Austria. The GDR responded by charging that Bonn was 
resurrecting the Hallstein Doctrine with its claim to sole representation. In a pro-
test note to the FRG, East Germany declared that the FRG was attempting to dis-
rupt the GDR's relations with third states, flagrantly violating international law and 
the UN Charter, and ignoring the Treaty on the Bases of Relations between East 
and West Germany. Considering the "unambiguous legal situation," the note 
asserted, it was obvious that Bonn was deliberately and purposefully disturbing the 
"further normalization of East-West German relations.,,64 
At the same time, Honecker's regime saw additional evidence that the Federal 
Republic intended to treat West Berlin as one of its Lander. The first incident 
viewed as such was the decision to establish a European vocational training center 
in West Berlin. This decision of the European Economic Community was seen as 
an "unlawful expansion of the presence of the FRG in West Berlin." The attempt 
to incorporate West Berlin into the EEC was, according to NeLleS Deutschland, 
obviously inspired by the FRG.65 The second incident occurred in March when 
West Berlin's Christian Democratic leader Peter Lorenz was kidnapped. Although 
initially the East Germans offered to help with the search, the search itself soon 
became a matter of controversy. The first East German objection was to the fact 
that 600 police from the Federal Republic were brought to West Berlin to assist 
with the police efforts. SED spokesmen implied that members of the FRG Bundes-
wehr were also involved. The Quadripartite Agreement, the SED charged, was being 
violated by these actions. The second objection was raised when West Berlin police 
began to carry out police measures on the GDR's Deutsche Reichsbahn and on West 
Berlin S-Bahn trains. Finally, the SED charged that the entire Lorenz affair was 
simply a campaign to make the West Berlin population insecure.6 6 
Several other less important disputes involving the GDR and West Berlin arose 
during this time. In 1973 the GDR began to question arrangements whereby West 
322 STEPHEN R. BOWERS 
Berlin pumped its sewage into the Teltow canal for processing by the East Berlin 
purification plant. The East Germans accused West Berlin of disregarding the inter-
ests of the GDR and warned that "serious consequences may stern from unilateral 
action by West Berlin authorities.,,6 7 Agreement on the waste water disposal ques-
tion was not reached until December 1974. West Berlin authorities denied charges 
that they were violating agreements with the GDR on the treatment of waste 
water, but did agree to a series of meetings on the question. Then in January the 
East Germans demanded higher prices for the removal of waste water from West 
Berlin.68 The West Berliners rejected the East German demand and the issue 
remained unsettled in 1975. 
In spite of these disputes Honecker has continued to insist on the feasibility of 
a complete normalization of relations between West Berlin and the GDR. Appar-
ently such issues as discussed above are not intended to wreck the development of 
detente over West Berlin. In an interview with the Associated Press on May 30, 
1974, Honecker explained with regard to West Berlin, 
If problems and difficulties arise at times this should not be dramatized, con-
sidering the complex nature of things and the different interests which we take 
into account. As far as we are concerned we do not seek a "cooling off" but rather 
a warming up of the international climate in the interests of peace and the people.6 9 
An Era of Confrontation or Negotiation? 
In order to make an assessment of the progress during these years toward 
achievement of detente between the two Germanies, a brief chronological summary 
might be helpful. The paramount events of 1971 were, of course, the Quadripartite 
Agreement by which the USSR set the tone of the period, the GDR's transit agree-
ments with West Germany and West Berlin which showed East Berlin's willingness 
to follow the Soviet lead, and the removal of Ulbricht which facilitated these 
developments. 
The next year was characterized by considerable progress offset by only one 
serious dispute. The most important product of negotiations was the Treaty on the 
Basis of Relations between the GDR and the FRG. This was followed by the 
exchange of property near Potsdamer Platz and the improvement in telephone con-
nections with West Berlin. The principal dispute of the year was the controversy 
over the "abuse" of the transit arrangements in the spring. 
In 1973 there was a series of important steps in the direction of detente: the 
establishment of the boundary commission, the frontier agreements, the beginning 
of talks on accident assistance, the opening of the DPA press office in East Berlin 
and of the ADN office in Bonn, and Honecker's precedent-breaking meeting with 
the SPD leaders. On the negative side, the disputes over "abuse" of the transit 
routes intensified and there were numerous arrests of Western escape helpers. There 
was also a controversy over new currency exchange regulations, sewage disposal by 
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West Berlin, and the effort to establish a branch of the FRG environmental office 
in West Berlin. 
In 1974 permanent missions were exchanged by East Berlin and Bonn, a health 
services agreement was concluded, and there was an important exchange of terri-
tory in the Anhalter district of Berlin. The most serious dispute was a charge of 
traffic delays by East German authorities on the Autobahn. The disagreement over 
the increased price of lignite briquettes was relatively minor. 
Finally, in 1975 there was a further improvement in telephone communications 
as 240 self-dialing lines were opened between East and West Berlin. However, 
serious confrontations occurred over several issues: the question of consular repre-
sentation of Germans abroad, the opening of a European Community (EC) voca-
tional training center in West Berlin, and the use of West German police in West 
Berlin during the Lorenz affair. 
The rise in the number of visitors going from East to West Germany and the 
improvement in economic relations covered the entire period. Both of these 
developments are significant departures from the era of confrontation characteris-
tic of the Ulbricht regime. 
In evaluating these developments, it becomes apparent that the successful nego-
tiations are more significant than the confrontations. The former have done much 
to alter the belief that the German problem was beyond resolution. More impor-
tantly, they have related to substantial political, economic, and human problems. 
The confrontations, by contrast, have often involved little more than disagreements 
about the implementation of measures resulting from the negotiations, such as the 
transit agreements. Others-for example, the sewage disposal and the briquette dis-
putes-have been no more than petty bickering. However, the issue of the FRG's 
relations with West Berlin and the matter of consular representation have been 
more serious and could conceivably disrupt the process of detente in Germany. The 
key point about these issues is that they have called into question the basic inter-
pretation of many of the agreements relating to relations among the GDR, the 
FRG, and West Berlin. 
The Honecker Policy and the USSR 
Completion of this review of the outlines of Honecker's policies pertaining to 
the West Berlin issue and related matters permits some observations and generaliza-
tions at this point. While the GDR's domestic policy has not been radically altered 
since Ulbricht's resignation, the East German foreign policy has undergone a con-
siderable change in emphasis since 1971. According to one prominent authority 
on East German affairs, many of the positions taken by Ulbricht during his last 
years were viewed by the Soviet leadership as irksome and disturbing. In an article 
in 1972 Peter C. Ludz ventured the observation regarding Ulbricht that 
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... In a certain sense he was projecting himself as a potential rival of Moscow in 
its claim to ideological leadership; beyond that, by stressing the GDR's independ-
ent achievements, he was obviously trying to strengthen its position and influence 
the international political arena.7 0 
The emphasis since Honecker's selection to replace Ulbricht has been very differ-
ent. Honecker has repeatedly stressed both the closeness of the GDR's positions 
to those of the Soviet Union as well as East Germany's unflinching support of 
the USSR as the leader of the "socialist community of nations." Honecker's 
recognition of a debt to the Soviet Union permeates discussions of the develop-
ment of the GDR. In 1974 he declared that the successful development of a 
socialist state in East Germany was possible only because its leadership "chose 
the right side in the great class battles of our time, the side of the Soviet Union 
and its battle tested party .... "71 Discussing the position of the GDR today, 
Honecker was able to declare on May 12, 1974, regarding his country's relation-
ship with the Soviet Union, 
Today relations between the GDR and the USSR have reached such a stage that 
our close cooperation penetrates practically every important sphere of society .... 
We agree on all political, ideological, and basic theoretical questions of social 
development. 72 
This absolute devotion to the guidance of the USSR is in sharp contrast with 
Ulbricht's talk about the independent achievements of the GDR, East Germany's 
unique road to socialism, and his independent proposals. Ulbricht's 1968 proposal, 
independent of any Soviet initiative, that the GDR and the FRG conclude a treaty 
on the renunciation of force and begin talks on the complete disarmament of both 
states illustrates the extent of his independence. 7 3 Honecker has avoided any such 
displays of arrogance. In his GDR-Soviet Friendship Day speech in May 1974 
Honecker made explicit the SED's stand regarding the Soviet Union's authoritative 
position when he asserted that "every step we are taldng today" is determined by 
the faith that only through a firm alliance with the USSR could East Germany's 
efforts succeed. This alliance was described as the key to the GDR's achievements 
in both economic and foreign affairs. Even the West, Honecker insisted, was 
aware of this and was therefore trying to "malign our alleged impairment of the 
sovereignty of our Republic." What the Western states fail to realize, he con-
tinued, is that the GDR's alliance with the USSR is of a "different quality from 
... [alliances] ... of capitalist countries." 
The East German-Soviet alliance, in Honecker's view, is based on a community 
of ideology, social system, and goals. The Soviet and SED leaderships share what 
Honecker describes as a common objective, namely, the benefit of the working 
class.74 His position is that such an alliance is both unique and unshakable. Enthu-
siastic reaffirmations of tIus position have been liberally sprinkled through 
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Honecker's policy statements, illustrating the most important instance of discon-
tinuity with the last years of the Ulbricht regime. 
While Honecker's declarations of fealty to the USSR are the most obvious new 
trends in GDR foreign policy since 1971, the stress on Bloc cooperation clearly 
constitutes the second most important pattern in this period. In this respect, the 
Honecker statements more closely resemble those of Ulbricht. The first concern 
regarding Bloc cooperation centers around the defense of the GDR. The position 
of the SED leadership is that cooperation with the Bloc provides a valuable pro-
tective shield for the GDR. Honecker forcefully expressed this view in his report to 
the Eighth SED Congress in June 1971. In his speech Honecker explained that the 
alliance with the "community of socialist states" was necessary because 
... through the collective defense of the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization, especially by the military shield of the Soviet Army, peace and 
security for the people of the German Democratic Republic are reliably pro-
tected.? 5 
By way of further invoking Bloc support, the East German leadership has gone so 
far as to describe the defense of the GDR as the "test for the East" in facing up 
to We stern imperialism. 7 6 
A second concern involving cooperation with the Bloc is an Eastward social 
orientation. East Germany's leadership is concerned about the development of 
social patterns that are congruent with those of its allies. In a speech to the SED's 
Central Committee in 1972 Politburo member Kurt Hager discussed the cultural 
policy of the SED. While explaining the need for a policy embracing the entire 
Socialist community, Hager said, 
The Socialist culture of the GDR occupies a firm place in the cultural develop-
ment of the Socialist countries. We consider it one of our most important cultural 
tasks to actively promote the mutual approach and fertilization of Socialist cul-
tures.? 7 
The East German government under both Honecker and Ulbricht has encouraged 
such "fertilization" through provision of ample opportunities for contacts 
between its citizens and those of its allies. One of the most important opportuni-
ties has been travel. According to figures released by the GDR Travel Bureau near 
the end of 1973, almost one million East Germans availed themselves of the 
opportunity to visit the GDR's Warsaw Pact neighbors in 1973.78 
A third concern in the GDR's stress on Bloc cooperation is coordination of the 
foreign poliCies of the Warsaw Pact states. As previously mentioned, Honecker 
describes relations between the USSR and the GDR as being dictated by common 
interests and ideology. The same is considered true of the USSR's relations with 
other East European states. Therefore, predictably, the East German leaderslup 
denies that the Brezhnev Doctrine can properly be regarded as evidence of 
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coercion within the Bloc. An example of such a denial was a 1973 "Voice of the 
GDR" broadcast in which Professor Joachim Raabe proclaimed the international 
duty of communists to defend socialism as a principal determinant of the behavior 
of Bloc members, the GDR included.79 From this, one can easily infer the neces-
sity, from the SED's view, of a coordination of Eastern policies, especially those 
regarding noncommunist states. Thus, the SED has sought support from its allies 
in the matter of West Germany's relations with West Berlin. 
Honecker enjoyed considerable success in 1973 as evidenced by the lack of 
progress for a time in talks between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic. 
The dispute arose from Bonn's effort to secure the right to represent not only 
West Berlin residents but also the city's institutions and associations abroad. The 
Czech leadership supported the GDR and branded the FRG's efforts a "gross 
provocation not only against the sovereignty of the GDR but also against the 
other socialist countries."8 0 The East Germans also viewed this as an effort to 
secure from the GDR's allies what the SED was unwilling to give and thus play 
the East European states off against each other. Accordingly, they issued a call 
for Eastern unity in the face of West German "pressure.,,81 
The East German drive for a more effective coordination of Bloc policies cul-
minated with the call for an international communist meeting. In May 1974 after 
a meeting in East Berlin with the General Secretary of the U.S. Communist Party, 
Gus Hall, Honecker noted that the tendency toward detente was now predomi-
nant in world developments and that the international balance of power was 
increasingly altering in favor of the Soviet Union and its allies. Yet, he continued, 
the opponents of detente were still trying to revive the cold war so there was a 
need for all the world's "peace forces" to work harder in the joint struggle for 
"international detente, security, and peace." The positive achievements the world 
is enjoying today, Honecker insisted with Hall's concurrence, were largely a pro-
duct of the program formulated at the 1969 international meeting of communist 
and workers' parties in Moscow. Therefore, both Honecker and Hall concluded, 
the appropriate thing would be the convocation of a new international consulta-
tion by the same parties in order to develop a plan to secure the benefits of 
detente. As Honecker explained, 
The point now is how to make the progress of detente irreversible, in defiance of 
all its adversaries. At the same time we are working for the further strengthening 
of the unity and cohesion of the world Communist movement.82 
Only a series of bilateral and multilateral exchanges between all the parties could 
facilitate the development of such a program, according to the SED First Secre-
tary. By taking the initiative in issuing such a call, the SED effectively demon-
strated the extent of its enthusiasm for the USSR's authority in the world commu-
nist movement and did much to contribute to the belief that East Germany can 
once more be considered the Kremlin's most faithful ally. 
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A final important SED concern relating to its position with the Bloc is shown 
by the stress placed on economic cooperation. Economic integration has been a 
major theme of the SED under both Ulbricht and Honecker. Planning in the . 
Comecon states has been one manifestation of this policy and the current pohcy 
calls for emphasis on long-range and complex planning among the member nations. 
The GDR has been especially active in the development of mathematical models 
to guide Comecon planning. 8 3 Since the formulation of Comecon's "Compre-
hensive Program," the creation of joint enterprises and institutes has been an 
additional manifestation of the SED's economic policy. By 1974 there were 
thirty-two examples of "socialist integration in action" in East Germany.84 Such 
an accomplishment clearly revealed the GDR's enthusiastic response to the 
Comecon program. During negotiations for the program, the less developed East 
European states were reluctant to support integration efforts. Rumania was the 
most vocal spokesman for the less developed nations, but other states were also 
alarmed by features of the plan. Czechoslovakia, one of the most advanced 
nations, was fearful that excessive integration would restrict its trade with West 
Europe. By contrast, East Germany-though wishing to retain its back-door 
entrance to the EC by its special relationship to the FRG economy-had much 
less to fear from the new program than its neighbors. In fact, the GDR, which had 
always been anxious for close economic relations with the USSR and was already 
its most important trading partner, stood to gain by implementation of the pro-
gram.8S 
East German attacks on Red China during the time of Honecker's control of 
the SED have advanced the GDR's status as an enthusiastic proponent of Soviet 
domination of the international communist movement. East German officials and 
publications have continually denounced China's international activities in general 
as well as the character of Peking's relations with Moscow. In August 1971, for 
example, the East Berlin daily Berliner Zeitung criticized Chinese activities in the 
Balkans, charging that such activities were being conducted with the active sup-
port of the United States. The Chinese leadership, according to the account, was 
guilty of big power chauvinism and was behaving in a manner hostile to world 
peace.86 East German charges have concentrated on Chinese-American relations, 
especially since the improvement in those relations. As the time for President. 
Nixon's trip to China neared, the attacks intensified. Not only was China depIcted 
as an ally of imperialism, but, according to Neues Deutschland, it had actually 
begun "coordinated collusion with the chief force of reaction in the world .... " 
The result could only be described as a "monstrous" situation in which the 
Chinese were seeking "to anticipate every wish of the Nixon government.,,87 In 
this respect, the Honecker policy differs greatly from that of Ulbricht who refused 
to join in the Bloc attacks on Red China during his last years. 
Attacks on Red China have frequently been linked with criticism of West Ger-
many. In October 1972 a "Voice of the GDR" commentary charged that the 
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improvement in West German-Chinese relations meant that there was an alliance 
between Bonn and Peking for the purpose of securing Chinese markets for the 
FRG. China, for its part, was depicted as attempting to join with forces in the 
Federal Republic seeking to disrupt detente. Chinese leaders were said to have a 
particularly strong affinity with the "archreactionary" Strauss.88 The FRG's 
establishment of diplomatic relations with China was viewed as absolute proof of 
Chinese treachery. 
lFinally, Honecker's call for a new international communist meeting was 
coupled with an attack on the Chinese. Declaring the need for fighting against 
distortions of Marxism-Leninism, Honecker described Maoism as the open enemy 
of the world communist movement and the national liberation cause. The Chi-
nese, he continued, had made common cause with the most reactionary forces in 
their efforts to oppose detente. A new world conference could be used in the 
continuing Soviet effort to secure a formal condemnation of the Red Chinese. 
The GDR's assistance in this effort would undoubtedly endear Honecker and his 
associates to the Kremlin. If the conference should materialize and be successful, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the GDR would gain credit from the USSR 
which it might hope to apply toward its more pressing international problems in 
the future. 
The Basic Tension in Soviet-East German Relations 
It requires little imagination to anticipate what use the GDR might wish to 
make of any credit it might build up with the Kremlin. Its ability actually to use 
the credit for the desired purpose could be another and more difficult matter. 
Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the GDR's position is uncom-
fortable in the era of detente. The origins and development of the East German 
regime have contributed to a political heritage which makes acceptance of detente 
difficult for the SED. In discussing the development of totalitarian systems, 
Friedrich A. Hayek, writing in 1944, commented that an enemy is an indispens-
able requisite of a totalitarian system.8 9 While the traditional concept of totali-
tarianism has been subject to some skepticism in recent years, its applicability to 
the GDR of the 1950s is beyond question. The fact that the citizens of East Ger-
many passed directly from the Hitler dictatorship into a communist dictatorship 
makes the totalitarian concept especially relevant to their case. Their experience 
with constant harangues about enemies, internal and external, can be traced back 
to 1933. Under Hitler the enemy was the international Jew. With the creation of 
the Soviet Zone in 1945, the theme was continued with a new enemy, Western 
imperialism, which had been a frequent target of Hitler's discourses as well. The 
personification of the enemy was West Germany primarily. 
The communist regime in East Germany became accustomed to tension from 
its first years. While the emphasis on tension is not nearly as great under Honecker 
as under Ulbricht, it remains an element of SED rhetoric. In the absence of a 
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sense of national identity, confrontation served a unifying purpose and helped 
stabilize the regime. The SED found security through confrontation and the need 
for confrontation continues today. Detente has a potentially destabilizing effect 
by virtue of the expectations that it encourages. It leads people to anticipate 
change after years of indoctrination against change. East Germany is not alone in 
the Bloc in its vulnerability to detente. Even the Soviet Union itself has had to 
face this uncertainty regarding the new policy. The Kremlin has sought to develop 
the ideological and institutional structures that could neutralize the politically 
dangerous psychological effect that could result from detente and cooperation 
between East and West.9 0 However, East German vulnerability is much greater 
than the USSR's. The SED's repeated reaffirmations of the need for a closed 
frontier illustrate this. The point was effectively made in 1972 by the SED news-
paper Leipziger Volkszeitung which printed a commentary warning against illu-
sions that the frontier with the FRG could be opened because of detente. The 
suggestion of open frontiers was described as "far removed from political 
reality."91 In a speech in 1975 GDR Minister of State Security Erich Mielke 
emphasized the continuing threats to East German security by warning of the 
"hostile plans, intentions, and machinations" of the GDR's enemies. The security 
services, he said, were still uncovering a "large number" of attempts by "hostile 
centers and forces" to harm the GDR. West Berlin and the FRG were identified 
as the bases for most of these efforts.9 2 The East German news media have also 
stressed the large number of border incidents taking place on the GDR-FRG 
frontier while also playing on the theme of the danger of ideological disarmament. 
In short, the enemy is still there, according to the SED. The fact that the SED 
so obviously feels a need for an enemy demonstrates the insecurity and instability 
of the regime. This is not to deny the existence of a very real rival in the Federal 
RepUblic. The point is that the hostility and aggression that the SED attributes to 
its rival are exaggerated. Security, however, as seen by the SED requires such 
exaggeration and dictates that the SED oppose detente, as Ulbricht successfully 
did for some time. The alliance with the USSR, on the other hand, now calls for 
support of detente in view of current Soviet policy. The USSR obviously pre-
vailed and Honecker replaced Ulbricht. The GDR's policy became more favorable 
to detente and included West Germany as an object of that policy. However, East 
Germany's instability remains and the SED can be expected to offer its Soviet ally 
a considerable amount of very cautious advice on how to proceed with detente, 
especially where it concerns the FRG. 
Honecker, of course, lacks the seniority that Ulbricht enjoyed and can cer-
tainly not wield the influence that his successor must have been able to exercise 
in dealings with the Kremlin. Yet, it is possible that Honecker might try to use 
whatever credit he can gain with the Soviet leadership in order either to sabotage 
or at least slow down detente. The USSR can generally be expected to push the 
GDR into line when it appears on the verge of straying too far afield. Possibly the 
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enthusiastic support of detente being voiced by the GDR in May 1974, which 
contrasted with the much weaker support in April, may have resulted from Soviet 
pressure in the wake of the Guillaume affair. With the exposure of Brandt's close 
personal aide, Gunter Guillaume, as an East German spy, it became known that 
the GDR's State Security Service had been sending considerable numbers of 
agents into the FRG since the early 1950s in an effort to infiltrate the West Ger-
man government. Guillaume, who was only one of several such "deep cover 
plants" in fairly important positions in the Bonn government, had evidently been 
aiding the GDR's agents in an attempt to blackmail Brandt about an affair he had 
with an East German woman.93 
The Kremlin may have feared that detente in Germany could suffer as a result 
of the exposure of the GDR's intensive espionage efforts in the FRG unless 
Honecker adopted a particularly accommodating attitude in the wake of the affair. 
The Soviets may have suspected that the East Germans were trying to sabotage 
detente by the activities of their Security Service. The question of the increased 
minimum exchange quota for persons visiting the GDR illustrated the extent of 
the SED's shift. Until early in the spring of 1974 East Germany assumed an 
uncompromising stance on the issue, making its refusal to alter the rates very 
clear to West Berlin negotiators. However, in an interview on May 30, Honecker 
said that the requisite decisions "will be taken by our side," clearly implying that 
the issue was not closed yet as GDR spokesmen had been stressing earlier.94 
Before the end of the year, a compromise had been reached. This, coupled with 
the GDR's new and very optimistic comments on detente, could be evidence of 
Soviet pressure on the East Germans to prove their goodwill after the exposure 
of their espionage efforts in West Germany. 
Does the selection of Honecker seem to have benefited the Soviet Union? As 
far as events up to this time are concerned, the answer must be an unqualified 
"yes." The East German press and the new First Secretary have given strong pub-
lic support to detente with West Germany and West Berlin. The GDR's support 
of Moscow's authority within the world communist movement, support which 
has been illustrated by Honecker's call for an international meeting, is further 
evidence of the wisdom of the USSR's support for Honecker. The changed empha-
sis in the SED newspaper Neues Deutschland provides further evidence of the 
wisdom of the Soviet move. Whereas, under Ulbricht the paper had become pre-
occupied with enumerating the sins of West Germany and devoted most of its 
foreign news coverage to stories about the FRG, after Ulbricht Neues Deutschland 
began to stress news about the Soviet Union and to ignore the Federal Republic. 
The absence of any claims of uniqueness for the East German path to commu-
nism and the initiation of polemics against Maoism must also please Moscow. The 
SED under Honecker has also improved relations with Yugoslavia, something 
which Ulbricht had been reluctant to do in spite of the USSR's rapprochement 
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with Tito. As mentioned earlier, the GDR has become the most faithful of Mos-
cow's allies once again. The substitution of Honecker for Ulbricht certainly 
hel~~d make this possible and thereby strengthened the USSR's East European 
posltwn. 
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Yet the future remains somewhat doubtful. The disputes over the misuse of 
t~e transit routes and the sale of GDR currency in the Western banks could easily 
dis~u?t the process of detente if the SED was in a position to sabotage Soviet 
pohcles toward the West. Disputes over the GDR's handling of traffic to West Ber-
lin w~re co~tinuing th~ough the ~a~ of 1974 as East German officials delayed 
tra~Slt traffIC up ~o th~ty hours. These incidents and others could erupt into 
major confrontatwns glVen the proper circumstances. Disagreements over the 
German translation of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin could serve as a pre-
text for a confrontation between East and West Berlin. The issue of the nature of 
the FRG's ties to West Berlin could also cause an incident. The exact nature of 
those ties has yet to be determined. The English version of "ties" implied social 
as well as communication ties while the Russian word for "ties" implied only the 
latter. Though some Western scholars believe that the issue has been clarified 
enough that the USSR will accept social and communication links 96 it seems 
most likely that the issue will be resolved through practice rather than further 
agreements or clarifications. And determination through practice can be an 
extre~ely d~sruptive process. The absence of specific guidelines for establishing 
what IS conSIdered proper West Berlin-FRG ties makes the prospects for disagree-
ment and confrontation particularly good. 
T~e controversy over alleged "witch hunting" by West Germany could also 
provIde fuel for future disputes. The SED has already commented on the ability 
of tlus "c~~ten:ptible campaign" ~o disturb the normalization of relations with 
the FRG. TIllS theme was amplified by a "Voice of the GDR" commentary in 
November 1974 charging that "anti-GDR propaganda on FRG radio and tele-
vision has been stepped up since the Basic Treaty came into force." Such "ideo-
logical subversion" was said to be proof that the "ruling forces" in the Federal 
Repub~c still hope~ for .the downfall of the GDR.98 Furthermore, a change of 
P?wer. ~ the I\.remlin mIght enable Honecker to improve his status and thereby 
his abIlity to veto moves toward detente affecting the GDR's policy toward the 
FRG and Wes: Berlin. In.this e:ent, the SED might easily disrupt Soviet policy. 
In sum, while the SOVIet Umon can take a considerable amount of satisfaction 
in developments s~nce Hone~ker's ~levation to First Secretary, the future is by no 
means secure. While the SOVIet Umon would likely desire a more stable and secure 
East German regime, the development of such a regime could encourage Honecker 
to become more independent. Ironically, the dependence that is a product of the 
GDR's instability also contributes to the maintenance of the GDR as a more 
malleable Soviet ally. In any event, the GDR could not indefinitely cripple Soviet 
efforts at maintaining detente with West Germany and West Berlin. However, the 
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East Germans might make the maintenance of Soviet policies toward the FRG 
and West Berlin much more difficult and costly in terms of concessions the Soviets 
might have to make toward East Germany. In this event, those elements of con-
tinuity between the Honecker and Ulbricht policies might overshadow those of 
contrast. 
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